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The Capital Stock and the Corporate Franchise Tax Versus
The Constitution in Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania tax law is well shuffled. As is common to all tax
legislation, the Pennsylvania system is sicklied o'er with the requirements
of the federal and state constitutions which often conflict with the demands
of political expediency and necessity for revenue. As a matter of state
policy it is desirable to encourage the organization of business enterprises
in Pennsylvania and induce foreign corporations to do business in the
state. At the same time there is the temptation to favor local business over
foreign. And, overshadowing other considerations, is the need of revenue.
As a matter of law, it is simple enough to draft a constitutional tax. But to
combine constitutionality with maximum revenue and satisfaction of pres-
sure group programs (inevitably seeking favored treatment for themselves)
requires a skilled hand. From the point of view of the Commonwealth,
the discrimination must lurk beneath the surface of the act and be not so
great as to attract the keen eye of the judiciary or, if it be ferreted out, it
must be such minor inequality as is deemed inevitable in every tax
system.'
The important question now in Pennsylvania is whether the Corpo-
rate Franchise Tax,2 in its effort to tap the resources of foreign corpora-
tions, has exceeded the limitations of constitutionality. This matter has not,
as yet, been definitely settled by the Supreme Court.8
The Pennsylvania system of taxing corporations, prior to the 1935
and 1937 amendments, included the capital stock tax 4 as its cornerstone.
This tax applied equally to foreign and domestic corporations. Its incidence
was on "each dollar of the actual value of (the corporation's) whole capital
stock", at a rate of five mills. In order to reach a base on which to apply
this rate, the legislature provided a means of evaluating the capital stock.
Each year the officers of the corporation were to report a capital stock
value which was to be ". . . (3) not less than the actual value indicated
or measured by consideration of the intrinsic value of its tangible property
and assets, and of the value of its good will and franchises and privileges,
as indicated by the material results of their exercise taking also into con-
sideration the amount of its indebtedness". 5
For years, the nature of this tax and the question of what items of
value could be included in computing the value of the capital stock were
subjects of constant litigation. At an early date it was decided that this
tax was not imposed on the privilege of being a corporation or for the
i. "Taxation is a practical and not a scientific problem." Philadelphia & Reading
Coal and Iron Co. v. Northumberland County Comm'rs, 229 Pa. 46o, 471, 79 Adt. io9,
112 (1911). See also Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania R. R., 297 Pa. 308, 317, 147 Atl.
242, 244 (1929) ; Commonwealth v. Eastern Securities Co., 309 Pa. 44, 48, 163 Atl. 157,
158 (932).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 72, §§ 1871-19o2.
3. Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas and Elec. Co., 336 Pa. 2o9, 8 A. (2d) 404
(939), 88 U. oF PA. L. REV. 232, decided that the allocation factors in the present law
were constitutional but expressly refused to pass on the question of unconstitutional dis-
crimination. The trial court held that the necessary result of the statute was to dis-
criminate against foreign corporations and was consequently unconstitutional.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 72, §§ 1871-19o2.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 72, § 1902.
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privilege of functioning as a corporation in the state. It was rather a "prop-
erty tax". 6 This initial determination, however, resulted in raising numerous
knotty constitutional problems and difficult matters of statutory construc-
tion. If it were a "property tax, on what specific property was the levy
-imposed? To answer that the "capital stock" is taxed seems to be unsatis-
factory because the term "capital stock" in the hands of the corporation has
no significance apart from the individual items, which, in their aggregate,
are represented by the term. The tax on the capital stock, then, is a tax
either on the collective assets of the corporation or on their "value". Since
it is difficult to ascribe the term "property" to "value", we are forced to
the conclusion that the tax is on all the assets of the corporation--the value
of the business-which is a synonym for "capital stock".
7
The statute states that the tax is to be imposed on "its whole capital
stock"." This would seem to imply that the value of all assets, wherever
situated, was to be taxed. But the Federal Constitution forbids the taxa-
tion of property or values where there is no jurisdiction over the subject
taxed.9 Consequently Pennsylvania can only tax the value of the busi-
ness-that proportion of all its assets-which is within the state, either
physically, in the case of tangible property, or according to legal fictions in
the case of intangible property. Consequently the word "whole" in the
statute had to be construed to mean all of the capital stock within the juris-
diction of the state or the statute had to be invalidated as an unconstitutional
attempt to tax extra-state values. The former solution was adopted.10
This necessarily meant that deductions had to be made in calculating the
"whole" value of the capital stock for taxing purposes.
The first obvious deduction was the value of tangible property outside
the state. This applied to all corporations owning such property. Secondly,
a deduction had to be allowed foreign corporations for the total value of
intangible property held by them.:" This was on the well-established theory
that intangibles have their tax situs at the domicle of their owner. A cor-
poration's domicile is the state of incorporation, hence a foreign corpora-
tion's intangible property has its tax situs elsewhere. Since it is located else-
where it is outside Pennsylvania's jurisdiction and, under the Constitution,
non-taxable. It is true that the exclusive application of the doctrine out-
lined above, has been destroyed by the birth of the "commercial domicile" 12
and "business situs" 13 principles. But the legislature did not, in terms,
provide for the taxation of intangibles held by foreign corporations by
either of these theories and the courts have consistently refused to read
them into the statute.14
The third necessary deduction is the value of United States bonds
held by the corporation. 5 In this case, also, the deduction must be made
6. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 342 (1905); Common-
wealth v. Standard Oil Co., ioi Pa. I19 (1882); Commonwealth v. Union Shipbuilding
Co., 271 Pa. 403, 114 Atl. 257 (1921); Commonwealth v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
I8 Dauph. 174 (1915).
7. Commonwealth v. Union Shipbuilding Co., 271 Pa. 403, 114 Atl. 257 (921).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 72, § 1871.
9. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905), "interpret-
ing" the due process clause of the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Io. Commonwealth v. Standard Oil Co., ioi Pa. 229 (1882).
ii. Commonwealth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 237 Pa. 333, 85 At!. 36o (1912).
12. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936).
13. Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133 (1900).
14. Commonwealth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 237 Pa. 333, 336, 85 Atl. 36o, 361
(1912). See discussion in Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas and Elec. Co., 336 Pa. 206,
8 A. (2d) 404 (1939).
15. Commonwealth v. Provident Life & Trust Co., 3 Dauph. 130 (900).
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because the Federal Constitution forbids a direct levy on the item in ques-
tion."" While Pennsylvania may have "jurisdiction" over these bonds in
the sense that they are within the boundaries of the state, it lacks the power
and hence the jurisdiction to tax them.
In addition to these necessary deductions, certain other exemptions
were allowed either by legislative lenience or by judicial construction of
the statute. The first of these is the exemption of the value of stock held
by the taxed corporation in a Pennsylvania corporation which was itself
already subject to the capital stock tax.'7 This is a purely judicial limita-
tion of the scope of the capital stock tax.'8 The reason for the exemption
can be found simply in the well-recognized policy and presumption against
double taxation. Since the held stock is already taxable to the issuing cor-
poration and since the capital stock tax is merely a tax on the assets includ-
ing, of course, the held stock, such stock must be exempt because it is
presumed that there is no intention to levy two taxes on the same subject
unless clearly provided otherwise by the legislature. It is not entirely
clear that failure to allow the exemption would result in double taxation in
the strict sense of that term, although it undoubtedly would result in a
double burden on the same values. As pointed out above, the tax is levied
on the assets of the corporation. Would a tax on the shares of stock in
the hands of the stockholder also be a tax on the assets of the corporation?
The answer is apparently in the affirmative for the purpose of determining
this exemption. Nevertheless, when it was claimed that an exemption
should be allowed for the value of stock held in another corporation which
stock represented property outside the state, on the grounds that taxation
of the stock was taxation of the foreign property, the contention was not
allowed.' 9 In other words, for this latter purpose, the capital stock in the
hands of the stockholder is not the same subject for taxing purposes as the
property which that stock represents.
The same general problem arose in connection with the evaluation of
the capital stock of a corporation whose chief asset was real estate in
Pennsylvania. The taxpayer claimed that the value of the real estate
should be deducted in the computation of the theory, repeatedly announced
by the courts, that the tax on the capital stock was a tax on the assets of
the corporation and since a state statute exempted real estate from state
taxation, inclusion of the real estate in the capital stock tax would be
violative of the statute. Analogy to those cases exempting the value of
tangible property outside the state would seem to require a holding for the
taxpayer. But the court pointed out that the tax was "on the capital
stock divided into shares, which is personal property", and that ". . . the
capital stock is not real estate, nor is the tax on capital stock a tax on real
estate".
20
16. Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 448 (U. S. 1829). There seems to be some ques-
tion as to whether the recent case of Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 3o6 U. S.
466 (939), which threw the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity into the discard
as far as the salaries of government officials is concerned, has application to United
States government bonds. See Lowndes, The Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court, z938
Term (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. I, 5. For the purposes of this discussion the old im-
munity is considered as law.
17. Commonwealth v. Fall Brook Coal Co., i56 Pa. 488, 26 Atl. 1071 (893);
Commonwealth v. Shenango Furnace Co., 268 Pa. 283, IIO Atl. 721 (1920).
18. In the Fall Brook case, supra note 17, the court said that since such capital
stock was by statute exempted from a personal property tax in the hands of the stock-
holder, it was therefore exempt from inclusion in calculating a capital stock tax against
a corporate holder. This seems to be a non sequitur.
ig. Commonwealth v. Shenango Furnace Co., 268 Pa. 283, 11o Atl. 721 (i920).
2o. Commonwealth v. Mammoth Vein Coal & Iron Co., 3 Dauph. 220 (i9oo);
Commonwealth v. Schwarzchild & Sulzberger Co., 12 Dauph. 159 (i9o9).
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Consequently it is seen that the subject of the tax changes with the
purpose for which that subject is to be determined. Those cases which
exempt assets over which Pennsylvania has no jurisdiction to tax stem
from a United States Supreme Court decision holding that taxation of
capital stock representing non-taxable property is, in effect, taxation of
that property.21 Those cases dealing with double taxation or violation of
the statute exempting real estate were deciding what assets the legislature
intended to reach. The reasoning is indeed inconsistent but the results
seem fair.
One more exemption must be noted here. Where any domestic cor-
poration owns a majority of the voting stock of another corporation, so
much of the value of all the stock in the other corporation is exempt as
represents property having a legal situs outside the state.22 This exemption
is, by its terms, accorded only to domestic corporations and was granted to
ameliorate the harshness of the statute on those companies which preferred
to hold foreign property through subsidiary corporations rather than
directly.
23
Before discussing the manner in which these exemptions were
deducted, it is well to note here that, except for the statutory exemption,
the prevailing consideration in favor of allowing the deductions was that
the tax was a property tax. From that fact it followed that the exemptions
should be granted.
Admitting, then, that the above exemptions should be granted, the
method of their deduction was also the subject of litigation. The statute,
as first drafted, provided for no exemptions-hence it provided no method
of deducting them. It did, however, provide that the value of the capital
stock should be calculated by considering both the assets and the indebted-
ness. 24 Accordingly the actual value of the capital stock would be less
than the sum of the intrinsic value of its assets. If, then, the actual value
of the capital stock were first computed and then the intrinsic value of
the exempt items were deducted from this figure or if they were left out
of the calculation altogether, the result would be that the exempt assets
would bear none of the depreciation attributed to indebtedness and the
tax base would be comparatively small. Hence, in order to arrive at a
fair evaluation of the total taxable capital stock, a formula was adopted.2
This formula involved three steps: first, an evaluation of the total capital
stock-apparently merely an addition of all assets, tangible and intangible,
including good will; secondly, a scaling down of this figure by "taking into
consideration the indebtedness"; and thirdly, this figure was reduced to
the extent of the proportion that the exempt assets bear to the total assets.
The result of this formula: taxable assets X value of capital stock-is
total assets
that the exempt assets are subtracted at their reduced value.
21. Supra note 6.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 72, § 1894.
23. It was originally held that if the domestic corporation owned substantially all
of the stock in a foreign corporation, that amount of the stock was exempt which rep-
resented foreign assets. Commonwealth v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 25, Pa. 22,
95 AtI. 807 (1915). But this holding was overruled in Commonwealth v. Sunbury Con-
verting Works, 286 Pa. 545, 134 Ati. 438 (1926). This section was enacted to rein-
state the Westinghouse ruling.
24. Supra note 5.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 72, § i896. This is the forrmila
adopted by the trial court in Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania R. R., 31 Dauph. 13
(1927), reversed, 297 Pa. 3o8, 147 At. 242 (1929). The section was adopted in 1932
and reinstate's the trial court's holding.
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THE EFFECT OF THE CAPITAL STOCK TAX
The result of this scheme of taxation and the interpretation of the
statute by the courts was highly unsatisfactory from the point of view of
the Commonwealth. Whereas the tax reached the value of practically all
tangible property in Pennsylvania owned by domestic corporations and
almost all the intangible value, it completely failed to reach any of the
intangible worth of the foreign corporations. 28  The idea, of course, had
been to reach the value of the business in Pennsylvania-a value admittedly
within Pennsylvania's taxing jurisdiction. This value naturally included
some intangible value. Under the Federal Constitution there appear to be
only two methods by which to reach these intangibles. One is by the
"commercial domicile" or "business situs" theories mentioned above; the
other, by the "unitary" or "going concern" theory of valuation of property
in the state. Under this latter theory, the property in the state is con-
sidered as having increased value because it is part of a large going con-
cern.2 The amount of the increase is that proportion of the total intangi-
ble property which the tangible property in the state bears to the total
tangible property. Although this theory seems to be in direct violation of
the rule that intangibles follow the person for tax purposes, it was early
sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 But the capital
stock tax failed to provide any such method of evaluation. Consequently,
the rule of mobilia sequuntur personam was applied in all its rigidity.
The terms of the statute, when applied in the light of the Constitution,
resulted in discrimination against domestic corporations; yet it seems never
to have been contended that the discrimination was unconstitutional.
The economics of the situation led the legislature to amend the statute
in an attempt to iron out the discrimination and fill the Commonwealth's
coffers.
THE FRANCHISE TAX
The 1935 amendment to the capital stock tax imposed on foreign
corporations a franchise tax as a substitute for the tax on the capital
stock. 29 The purpose of the amendment was to reach intangible values in
foreign corporations. The franchise tax is one on the privilege of doing
business in Pennsylvania, measured by the value of that business 30 and
levied at the rate of five mills. In order to arrive at a tax base---called a
"taxable value" in the statute-the total value of the corporation is com-
puted. This value is considered as having a direct relation to the value of
the franchise to do business in Pennsylvania and the proportionate worth
is found by comparing the tangible property, payroll, and gross receipts
respectively located in, paid in, and derived from Pennsylvania with the
total tangible property, payroll, and gross receipts."3 Nowhere in this pro-
cedure does the statute provide for any exemptions in finally computing the
taxable value. This scheme of taxation is merely an application of the
"going concern" or "unitary" principle expounded above except that this
time it is applied to a privilege instead of property. It has the same effect
26. Commonwealth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 237 Pa. 333, 85 AtI. 36o (1912).
27. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194 (897). See an illuminating dis-
cussion of this evaluation theory in Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Author-
ity by the Taxing Powers of the States (1929) 32 HARv. L. Ray. 234.
28. Adams Express case, supra note 27.
29. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 72, § 1871.
3o. Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Co., 336 Pa. 206, 8 A. (2d) 404 (939),
88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 232.
31. Supra note 29.
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of subjecting "foreign" intangibles to taxation. How much of this intangi-
ble worth is thus ingeniously reached depends, of course, on the allocation
formula.
Suppose both Massachusetts and Texas levied a franchise tax on a
Delaware corporation manufacturing oil drills in Massachusetts and selling
them in Texas. If the allocation factor in Massachusetts were gross sales
in Massachusetts compared to total gross sales and the factor in Texas
were tangible property in Texas as compared with total tangible property,
neither state would tap the intangible resources of the corporation. And
conversely, if Massachusetts used the property factor and Texas the sales
factor, each state would tax practically the total intangible value. On the
other hand, if both states used both factors, the intangible tax pie would be
evenly divided between them. 2 Thus it appears that the more items, hav-
ing relation to a corporation's value, used in the allocating fractions, the
more equitable the distribution of intangibles among the taxing states. But
equitable distribution has never been a constitutional sine qua non in regard
to the taxation of intangibles by a franchise tax. Multi-state burden is no
objection.83 All that is required is that the allocation factor have some
reasonable relation to the value of the corporate franchise and the Penn-
sylvania system adequately meets this requirement.3 4
Admitting then, that, in the abstract, the state has jurisdiction to tax
foreign corporations according to the present law, the question still remains
whether, taking the system as a whole, the legislature has not overreached
and violated either the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution 35
or the uniformity clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, " or both.
It has often been said that a foreign corporation, when admitted to do
business in a state, is entitled to the equal protection of the laws. This
means that it may not be subjected to penalties or burdens not imposed on
others within the same classification. At the same time, it has been said
that foreign corporations may be treated differently for the purposes of
taxation."" Thus we have two apparently contradictory theories. Recon-
ciliation is reached through compromise. Whereas it is permissible to tax
foreign corporations under a different theory and by a different tax, the net
result must be that the burden is not materially different.39
32. Delaware's admitted right to tax the total intangible property is due to the rule
that a corporation's domicile is the state of incorporation and since intangibles follow
the person for tax purposes, all the intangibles are in Delaware. Cream of Wheat Co.
v. Grand Forks County, 253 U. S. 325 (1920). The survival of this fiction is respon-
sible for a great deal of the current tax inequality and stands in the way of a satis-
factory solution of the multi-state taxation problem.
33. First Bank Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234 (1937). For discussion of mul-
tiple burden on intangibles in other fields of taxation see (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. Rrv.
12o. For the question of multiple burden in regard to the Commerce Clause see Note
(1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 712.
34. Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Co., 237 Pa. 206, 8 A. (2d) 404
(1939), 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 232.
35. U. S. CONsT. Amend. XIV, § 2.
36. PA. CONsT. Art. IX, § i.
37. Southern Ry. v. Green, 216 U. S. 400 (1gio) ; Hanover Ins. Co. v. Harding,
272 U. S. 494 (1926) ; Northwestern National Ins. Co. v. Lee, 49 F. (2d) 274 (D. Ore.
1931) ; cf. National Savings & Trust Ass'n v. Gillis, 35 F. (2d) 386 (D. Idaho, 1929).
38. Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147 (19z8); Northwestern
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132 (1918); Southern Realty Corp. v.
McCallum, i F. Supp. 614 (W. D. Tex. 1932).
39. Concordia Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U. S. 535 .(1934). "Mathematical equiva-
lence is neither required nor attainable, nor is identity in mere modes of taxation of im-
portance where there is substantial equality in the resulting burdens." Id. at 547.
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The problem is whether the franchise tax imposes a burden "equal"
to that imposed by the capital stock tax on domestic corporations. In
this connection the term "equal" must be rather carefully defined.
Equality does not mean that domestic corporations and foreign corporations
of equal total net worth pay an "equal" tax. For Pennsylvania has juris-
diction to tax only that part of the value of a corporation which can be
legally assigned to Pennsylvania. Before an economic comparison can be
made for the purpose of determining whether the legislature has discrim-
inated, the amount which the state has power to tax under the Constitution
must be ascertained.
For purposes of taxation it has been shown that certain intangibles of
foreign corporations are without the jurisdiction of the taxing state.
Theoretically its tangible property located elsewhere is likewise immune
because it is often said that under no guise may a state reach property out-
side its borders. But this overlooks the effect of the "going concern" theory
of valuation. If a large proportion of a corporation's holdings outside the
state is tangible property and the "going concern" valuation is applied
to values within the state, the amount of increase over the intrinsic worth
of local assets must be largely derived from the foreign tangible property.
40
The result is that the amount over which the state has jurisdiction to tax
will vary according to its method of evaluating assets within its borders.
Thus, in addition to comparing results of the different taxing schemes when
applied to equal values over which Pennsylvania has jurisdiction, it is
important to notice on what theory that jurisdiction was gained in each
case.
For the purpose of this investigation it is immaterial that the tax is on
the franchise in the one case and on property in the other. It is the result
which matters and not the theory. If, in fact, the use of the different theory
or form of taxing foreign corporations imposes on them a greater burden,
the equal protection clause does the rest.
Before advancing to the comparison, it is well to bear in mind that
certain rules and methods of ascertaining both taxes spring, not from the
statute, but from decisions of courts and administrative rulings. Conse-
quently, if the statutes can be administered so as to impose an equal burden,
it is not necessary that the statute itself expressly prescribe this equality.41
A HYPOTHETICAL CASE
Suppose two corporations. One is organized under the laws of Penn-
sylvania and the other under the laws of Delaware. Both are doing a manu-
facturing business in Pennsylvania and have a small annex plant in New
40. In Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66 (i92O), and in Hans Rees' Sons v. North
Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (193), tax assessments were invalidated because, as to those
corporations complaining, the local allocation formula had resulted in allocating to the
taxing state an excessive value. But see Ford Motor Co. v. Clark, oo F. (2d) 515
(C. C. A. 5th, 1938), aff'd, Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 6o Sup. Ct. 273 (1939). In
that case a gross receipts formula succeeded in allocating to Texas, for franchise tax
purposes, a business value of $23,0o0,oo0 when the value of assets, including some in-
tangibles, in Texas was only $3,oooo0o. Since the fraction was applied to the whole
capital worth of the corporation a certain percentage of its vast plant in Detroit was
necessarily included. It was argued, citing the Hans Rees case, that the formula pro-
duced "absurd results". In disposing of this contention the circuit court said that the
Hans Rees case was irrelevant and added: "If it be practicable to separate the manu-
facturing from selling activities, this petition affords no data to do it." Id. at 517. The
Supreme Court did not attempt to distinguish between allocating intangibles and allocat-
ing value derived from foreign tangibles. Nor was any mention made of the Hans Rees
case. Was it overruled sib silentio?
41. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Harding, 327 Ill. 59o, 158 N. E. 849 (1927).
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Jersey. Both employ a large sales force operating on a national scale.
Each owns tax-free United States bonds. Each owns stock in a Penn-
sylvania corporation which is itself subject to the capital stock tax. Each
owns stock in foreign corporations. Each owns a majority of the stock in
a foreign corporation and this stock represents an equal value of prop-
erty outside Pennsylvania. Each is capitalized at an equal amount
and each is indebted to the same degree and is earning equal dividends.
Their balance sheet is identical:
Assets Liabilities
Pennsylvania plant $iooooo First mortgage bonds $ 50,000
New Jersey plant 4o,ooo Accounts payable 50,000
Tax free bonds 5,00 i,ooo shares of capital
Stock in Pa. corporations 5,00o stock ($IOO par value) IOO,00o
Stock in foreign corpora-
tions 1O,00o $2oo,00
Stock in foreign corpora-
tion equal to a majority
of the outstanding voting
stock IO,00o
Accounts receivable I0,000
$180,000
Deficit 20,000
$200,O00
The first problem here presented is to determine what assets are
within Pennsylvania and what value can be attributed to those assets. First
the case of the domestic corporation under the capital stock tax as con-
strued by the courts: The value of the New Jersey plant must be deducted.
This is done by the formula adopted by the courts and later incorporated
in the statute. First the total worth of the assets is found-I8oOOO.
Then the indebtedness is "taken into consideration" thus finding the net
worth of the corporation-$8o,00o. From this figure the actual value of
the New Jersey plant is deducted. The actual value is found by reducing
its intrinsic value in the proportion that all the assets have been reduced
by taking the indebtedness into consideration. The reduced value of the
New Jersey plant is $17,777.78 which, when deducted from the total actual
value of the corporation, leaves within Pennsylvania $62,222.22.
Turning now to the operation of the franchise tax on the foreign cor-
poration, we find a different picture. The capital stock is divided into
thirds-$26,666.67-and each third is multiplied by a fraction. The sum
of the resulting three products is the value assigned to Pennsylvania.
4 2
The first fraction is the tangible property fraction. In this case
IO/I4ths of the tangible property is in Pennsylvania. Io/I4ths of
$26,666.67 is $19,o47.62.
The second fraction is the wages fraction. Assuming that sales head-
quarters are in Pennsylvania and that the salesmen report directly to the
home office, salesmen's wages are, under the statute,43 assignable to Penn-
sylvania. Assuming that wages paid to the employees of the New
Jersey plant are 1/3 of the wages paid in the manufacturing part of the
42. PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 72, § 1871.
43. Ibid.
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business and that sales wages are 1/2 of the total wages, then the wage
fraction is 5/6ths of $26,666.67, or $22,222.23.
The third fraction is the gross receipts fraction. Assuming that the
corporation's salesmen report sales income directly to the home office, all
gross receipts are assignable to Pennsylvania.44 Consequently the fraction
in this case is i and the full value of the last one-third part of the capital
stock is allocated to Pennsylvania.
The sum of these three products is $67,936.52. Compare this with
the sum of $62,222.22 assigned to Pennsylvania under the capital stock tax.
Apart from the question of intangible value thus neatly allocated to
Pennsylvania, it is evident that the operation of the franchise statute suc-
ceeds in assigning to the state a value of $5,714.32 which can be attributed
only to the New Jersey real estate. This would be the result in every case
in which the value of the tangible property is more than one-third of the
total worth of the corporation for the other two fractions in the formula
will surely operate so as to allocate some of the foreign property value to
Pennsylvania. Thus it would be hard to maintain that this was merely a
fortuitous inequality peculiar to the hypothetical situation.
This initial inequality stems from a different method of evaluation. In
the case of the domestic corporation the worth of the corporation is found
by mere addition of the actual value of the individual items. In the case
of the foreign corporation, the "going concern" method is used. It is true
that the statute nowhere specifically provides for this result but it is inherent
in the different forms used. The capital stock tax gives complete exemp-
tion for foreign property-the franchise tax only partial exemption. It
appears to the writer that this discrepancy, admittedly a lurking one, comes
within the prohibition of both the uniformity and equal protection clauses.
But if the same deduction may be allowed the foreign corporations by
judicial "construction" of the act, then the discrimination will, of course,
be dissipated and the system upheld. It is difficult to see on what prin-
ciple it could be allowed. It cannot be successfully maintained that the
deduction must be given because the tax is, in effect, a tax on foreign prop-
erty as was done in the case of the capital stock tax. The purpose of
changing the form of the law was expressly to obviate this objection to tax-
ing the resources of foreign corporations. This the change has done. The
tax is not on property. It is on the privilege of doing business measured by
the value of that business in Pennsylvania. Intrinsically the levy is unim-
peachable. Its only flaw appears when it is viewed in relation to the capital
stock tax. At that point discrimination is seen. The only way presented
to allow the deduction is by reasoning that the legislature could not have
meant to be unconstitutionally discriminating and hence must have meant
the franchise tax to be so administered as not to place a burden on
values not touched by the capital stock tax.45 But the whole purpose of the
franchise tax was to reach the going concern value of the business and this
value is derived as much from foreign tangibles as "foreign" intangibles."
That the legislature intended to exempt the foreign tangibles is not prob-
able under the circumstances. Besides, in order to reach the desired result,
44. Ibid.
45. See Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Co., 237 Pa. 2o6, 8 A. (2d) 404
(939), 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 232, where the court found no difficulty in directing tax
officials to exclude from their calculation of the tax the value of the taxpayer's business
which had no relation to the business done in Pennsylvania.
46. Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 (1937) ; Ford Motor Co.
v. Beauchamp, 6o Sup. Ct. 273 (1939).
NO TES
the court would have to change the wording of the statute which provides
that the allocation formula shall be applied to the whole capital stock.
EXEMPTION OF UNITED STATES BONDS
In the case of the domestic corporation, the actual value of these bonds
must also be deducted. Their actual value, found by applying the same
calculation as in the case of foreign tangible property, is $2,222.22. When
this figure is deducted from the $62,222.22 assigned to Pennsylvania, a
$6o,ooo taxable balance is left.
There is no deduction allowed the foreign corporation by the statute.
Once more, however, it may be that the courts may construe the deduction
into the franchise tax. It will be remembered that the necessity for exempt-
ing the bonds in assessing the capital stock tax arose from the constitutional
prohibition of laying a direct tax on them. Since the capital stock tax was
a property tax which can be neither measured by nor levied on non-
taxables, the exemption followed. It is, of course, true that the bonds
could be used in the calculation of a franchise tax if the state chose to tax
domestic corporations in this way.47 This is exactly what was done in the
case of foreign corporations and, standing by itself, it would be perfectly
valid. Again, however, it is the system as a whole which must stand the
constitutional test. In the case given, the effect of the system is to tax the
foreign corporation on a base $2,222.22 larger than that assessed against
domestic corporation.
It may be argued that the inequality is forced on the state by the
requirements of the Constitution and not through any discriminatory action
on the part of the legislature. Will the Constitution strike down a law
which is discriminatory in results because of the Constitution? But the
Constitution does not forbid the state to reach the value of the bonds. It
merely prohibits direct taxation. It seems a bit incongruous for the state
to maintain that it cannot tax the bonds in the hands of domestic corpora-
tions and at the same time tax a value derived from the bonds in the hands
of foreign corporations. It seems more logical to say that the legislature
has preferred to absolve the domestic corporation-granted an exemption.
It has done this just as effectively by choosing a property tax as if it had
specifically exempted this item in the calculation of a franchise tax. In
order to equalize the burden it would seem that the exemption should be
granted to the foreign corporation. 48 But again, on what principle can the
exemption be allowed? The amount allocated to Pennsylvania by the
formula does not represent any specific property which can be said to be
totally within the state for taxing (or exempting) purposes. It is rather
an abstraction, a figure representing a proportion of all assets, or, as the
statute calls it, a "taxable value". In no case has an exemption been allowed
in computing a franchise tax by reason of the fact that some of the assets
of the corporation were tax free.
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Thus once more the only grounds for judicially allowing the deduction
would be that the legislature didn't intend to be discriminatory-an assump-
tion belied by the very terms of the statute and its necessary effect.
47. Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594 (1889) ; Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285
U. S. 480 (1932) ; Manufacturer's Ins. Co. v. Loud, 99 Mass. 146 (1868).
48. But see Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147, 157 (1917) "... a
State does not surrender or abridge its power to change and revise its taxing system
and tax rates by merely licensing or permitting a foreign corporation to engage in local
business".
49. See notes 46 and 47 supra.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
EXEMPTION OF STOCK IN OTHER DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS AND CERTAIN
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
The same reasoning applies to the exemption allowed domestic corpo-
rations on stock in other domestic corporations already subjected to the
capital stock tax. In this case, however, there is no constitutional prohibi-
tion requiring this value to be exempted from the capital stock tax. Penn-
sylvania has power to tax it but is judicially presumed not to have so
intended.50 Will the same presumption be applied to the franchise tax?
It is impossible to argue in this case that the franchise tax imposes a levy
on the same subject as the capital stock tax-that the held stock would be
taxed twice. The legislature went out of its way to make the tax on foreign
corporations an excise tax. How can an excise tax levy on the same sub-
ject as a property tax. Nevertheless, as in the case of the capital stock
tax, a double burden is imposed.51 Aside from the question of finding a
legalistic reason for giving the exemption, the problem is whether the
legislature intended it to be given. For reasons given below in discussing
the method of deducting any exemptions which might be given, it is sub-
mitted that the legislature did not so intend.
The last exemption accorded domestic corporations is the value of
stock in foreign corporations if the domestic corporations owns a majority
of the voting stock. This exemption is purely statutory and is based on
nothing more than a spirit of self-denial on the part of the legislature. It
did not feel so charitable toward the foreign corporation. Here is an item
which the franchise tax was designed to tap---intangibles held by foreign
corporations. The courts could grant an equal exemption to foreign cor-
porations only by adding to the statute what was intentionally left out.
Deducting these last exemptions at their actual value from the $6o,ooo
value left after deducting the United States bonds leaves a taxable balance
of $53,333.33. Applying the five mill rate, we find that the amount of the
capital stock tax on the domestic corporation is $266.67. No deductions
being allowed the foreign corporation, the five mill rate is applied to the
value originally allocated by the statutory formula-$67,936.52-and the
amount of the franchise tax is $339.68.
But even supposing that all the above exemptions could be read into
the law, there remains the difficulty of determining to what extent the
exempt assets are to be deducted. It must be remembered that each asset
is already exempted to a certain extent by the allocation formula. All assets
are lumped together and a proportion of their aggregate, reduced by taking
into consideration the indebtedness, is abandoned. By this method some
assets admittedly taxable by Pennsylvania in their entirety are only taxed
proportionally while others admittedly not taxable by Pennsylvania are
also taxed proportionally.
In an extraordinary case, of course, the amount that the assets within
the state are abandoned by the formula might exactly equal the deduction
allowed under the capital stock tax. In such a case the result would be
non-discriminatory. But that such a situation should arise is highly improb-
able and it would be drastic indeed to uphold a statute on the grounds that
it might in its operation, by remote possibility, be constitutional.
5o. See note 17 supra.
51. But see In re Arrott's Estate, 322 Pa. 367, 372, I85 Atl. 697, 699 (1936), where
an exemption was allowed under the personal property tax. PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
don, Supp. 7939) tit. 72, § 3242 et seq., on the grounds of double taxation in that the
franchise tax was substantially a tax on the capital stock.
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The only way, then, to include the exemptions in the franchise tax
would be to deduct these items from the value of the capital stock before
the allocation formula is applied. The figure representing the value of the
capital stock in the formula would then be made up of non-exempt intangi-
bles and tangible property within Pennsylvania. When the allocation
formula is applied to this figure-$53,333.33-the resulting tax base is
$45,291.OO. Of this latter figure $37,742.50 would represent tangible
property. Since the "actual" value of the Pennsylvania plant is $44,444.44
it is evident that this system would mean abandoning $6,701.94 of this
admittedly taxable value without any corresponding "increase" from for-
eign tangibles. That the legislature intended to release part of the taxable
value within Pennsylvania is hardly to be supposed.
Nevertheless, if such a procedure were followed the resulting tax
would amount to $226.45. Comparing this with the $266.67 assessment
against the domestic corporation, we find that substantial equality is
achieved. The discrepancy is attributable to $1,340.39 worth of intangible
value which could not be reasonably attributed to Pennsylvania and
$6,7oI.94 abandoned by the improvident form of the allocating formula
when applied to the depleted "capital stock value" as explained above.
While it is possible thus to "construe" the law to make it conform to
the constitution, it cannot be done without, in effect, changing not only
the existing wording but also the purpose and spirit of the law as it stands.
To write four exemptions into the act without any reason therefor but to
make results conform to those arrived at under the capital stock tax and
then to devise a method of deducting these exemptions would not be worthy
of the term "construction". That these things must be done, however,
before the taxing system will conform to the constitutional requirement of
equality and uniformity seems plain. The act as it stands is distinctly
discriminatory. It is suggested that it is for the legislature and not the
courts to enact the needed reform.
A.P.
Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Documentary Evidence
Originating With Client's Agent
It is an accepted rule that the common law immunity from disclosure
which is accorded to confidential communications between an attorney and
client, arising out of that relationship and pertaining to the subject matter
of professional employment,' applies not only to oral expressions, but
equally to documents and all other written matter.2  In many states the
rule forbidding disclosure has been enacted into statute, but in no instance
has the privilege which existed at common law been curtailed. Rather, the
tendency of the more recent enactments has been to extend the rule to
I. Chirac v. Reinicker, ii Wheat. 28o (U. S. 1826) ; Liggett v. Glenn, 51 Fed. 381
(C. C. A. 8th, i892) ; Parrish v. Gates, 29 Ala. 254 (1856) ; Lorimer v. Lorimer, 124
Mich. 631, 83 N. W. 6og (19oo); Downey v. Owen, 98 App. Div. 411, 90 N. Y. Supp.
280 (4th Dep't 1904) ; Dickson v. Bills, 144 Wis. 171, 128 N. W. 868 (1910). For gen-
eral treatments of the entire subject of attorney-client communications, see 5 WIGMORa_
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2285 et seq.; 5 JONES, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2154 et seq.;
I THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW (1914) § 92 et seq.
2. Edison Electric Light Co. v. United States Electric Lighting Co., 44 Fed. 294
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 180o); Lynde v. Judd, 3 Day 499 (Conn. 1807); Anonymous, 8
Mass. 369 (1811) ; Nelson v. Becker, 32 Neb. 99, 48 N. W. o62 (1801) ; Selden v. State.
74 Wis. 271, 42 N. XV. 218 (i88g).
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include confidential employees of an attorney within the privilege.3 How-
ever, its application is always dependent on the circumstances surrounding
the creation of the communication, and particularly so with respect to
documentary evidence. Two categories have crystallized into which all
written or printed matter must be placed before testing its immunity from
disclosure. The first and dearest situation concerns the claim of privilege
to documents which owe their existence to the very fact of communication,
or which have originated primarily for the purpose of such communication.
To these the true attorney-client privilege is properly applied; and being
the precise situation for which the rule was formulated, 4 it is here that it
has had its most consistent application. 5 Contrasted with documents which
fall within this category are those which originate for other purposes but
have been intrusted to an attorney during the course of communications.
If the mere fact of possession by the attorney were sufficient to raise the
privilege, any documentary evidence, on the slightest pretext, could be
given into an attorney's keeping in confidence in order to avoid an order
for discovery or a notice to produce. Accordingly, the rationale for this
class of papers is that only when the client has some valid privilege against
their production, as for example that they might incriminate him, may the
attorney who has the documents assert the privilege, and then it is on
behalf of the client." But if the client could have raised no objection, then
the attorney must produce when called upon to do so.
7
3. For a classification of the twenty-nine statutes in effect and a discussion of their
trends, see Note (1938) 36 MICH. L. REy. 641, 648.
4. The bases on which the privilege is founded are apparent from the following
well-considered quotations: "The object and meaning of the rule is this: that as, by
reason of the complexity and difficulty of our law, litigation can only be properly con-
ducted by professional men, it is absolutely necessary that a man, in order to prosecute
his rights or to defend himself from an improper claim, should have recourse'to the
assistance of professional lawyers, and it being so absolutely necessary, it is equally
necessary, to use a vulgar phrase, that he should be able to make a clean breast of it to
the gentleman whom he consults . . .; that he should be able to place unrestricted
and unbounded confidence in the professional agent, and that the communications he so
makes to him should be kept secret, unless with his consent (for it is his privilege, and
not the privilege of the confidential agent), that he should be enabled properly to con-
duct his litigation. That is the meaning of the rule." Anderson v. Bank of British
Columbia, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 644, 649, 24 W. R. 724, 725 (1876). "The policy of the privi-
lege has been plainly grounded, since the latter part of the I7OOs, on subjective consid-
erations. In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; and hence
the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent. Such is the mod-
ern theory." 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291.
5. The most obvious examples of this type are letters passing between attorney
and client. Most courts have applied the rule as including both client's and attorney's
letters. Ex parte Schneider, 294 S. W. 736, 738 (Mo. App. 1927). See also Ganus v.
Tew, 163 Ala. 358, 50 So. IOOO (iog) ; Hardy v. Martin, 15o Cal. 341, 89 Pac. InI
(19o7) ; Selden v. State, 74 Wis. 271, 42 N. W. 218 (1889). And this, even when the
client is a corporation. Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. v. Ward, 196 Ala. 327, 71 So. 404
(1916). However, there has been some indication that there is no policy requiring the
protection of the attorney's letters to the client. See Rylee v. Bank of Statham, 7 Ga.
App. 489, 492, 67 S. E. 383, 385 (91o).
6. Lynde v. Judd, 3 Day 499 (Conn. 18o7); Anonymous, 8 Mass. 369 (18II);
Jackson v. Burtis, 14 Johns. 390 (N. Y. 1817) ; People v. Minkowitz, 220 N. Y. 399,
115 N. E. 987 (1917); Selden v. State, 74 Wis. 271, 42 N. W. 218 (1889).
7. Andrews v. Ohio & Miss. R. R., 14 Ind. 169 (i86o) ; Jones v. Reilly, 174 N. Y.
97, 66 N. E. 649 (1903) ; Banker's Money Order Ass'n v. Nachod, 12o App. Div. 732,
305 N. Y. Supp. 773 (Ist Dep't 19o7) ; Pearson v. Yoder, 39 Okla. 105, 334 Pac. 421
(1913). But see Stokoe v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 4o Minn. 545, 546, 42 N. W. 482
(1889) ; Dover v. Harrell, 58 Ga. 572, 574 (1877). In the latter case a code provision
explains the decision.
NOTES
AGENT'S COiM MUNICATIONS
When the documents originate with the client alone, decisions under
the two categories discussed evince a satisfactory degree of consistency;
but an examination of the cases involving documents which originate with
the client's agent reveals serious doubt as to the state of the law. Not
only, as Dean Wigmore points out, are the proper limits of this situation
"apparently too intricate to permit of a definite rule which will solve all
concrete cases", 8 but these bearings of the privilege have received very little
development in the United States.9 The only basis for extending this public
policy exception 10 to cover agent's communications seems to be a realiza-
tion that the client must be left free to delegate his privilege of confidence ".
or otherwise its intended effect may be nullified. This is obviously true in
many cases, as for example, where an illiterate employs an amanuensis to
write the confidential letter.12  However, when agents of a corporation
originate the communication the problem becomes more complex. Two
typical instances of this type are the cases involving reports to railway
officers by company agents, and reports to insurance companies.
In the leading American case involving railway reports, Davenport
v. Pennsylvania R. R.,13 the court went far in applying immunity to reports
of a freight agent made to the company's main offices concerning the loss
of a shipper's goods. When the production of the reports was requested,
the company answered that they had been submitted for the purpose of
resisting the shipper's claim and raised the defense of privilege. In sus-
taining the defense, the court said of the reports, "They were in effect made
to counsel, for they were made for the use of counsel in resisting this par-
ticular claim and were transmitted to the proper officer, that he might
deliver them to the attorney to whom the defense of the company might
be committed." 14 Clearly, the court considered the documents as com-
munications originating for the purpose of communicating information to
an attorney. Thus, they fall within the first category and are privileged
from disclosure. However, since they were made before the establishment
of any actual attorney-client relationship, the existence of which is con-
sidered a prerequisite in any case where the privilege is claimed,15 they
might be construed as independent, pre-existing documents whose admissi-
bility would be governed by the client's independent grounds for objection.
It would seem that this procedure would afford all the protection that such
a client needs in that situation. Furthermore, while the tenor of the court's
language would seem to accept the English rule that documents prepared
with a bona fide intention of being communicated to an attorney are within
8. 5 WIGm0RE, EVIDENCE § 2319A (3).
q. Id. at § 2319C.
io. See note 4 supra.
I1. 5 WIGoRE, EVIDENCE § 2317.
12. State v. Lopono, 85 N. J. L. 357, 88 Atl. 1045 (913) (this case, ignoring the
limitations imposed by third party knowledge, takes the liberal view that the privilege
extends to any agent of either attorney or client through whom the communication may
be transmitted) ; see also Long v. Siebrecht, 196 App. Div. 74, 187 N. Y. Supp. i5o (2d
Dep't 1921). For a discussion of third party knowledge, which bears a close relation-
ship to this situation, see Note (1938) 36 Micn. L. REv. 641.
13. i66 Pa. 480, 31 Atl. 245 (2895).
14. Id. at 486, 3 Atl. at 246.
25. 5 JONEs, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1926) § 2166 and cases therein cited at note I. See
also I THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW (1914) § 101.
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the privilege, 16 it has been held by at least one court in this country that
to extend the rule to cover documents merely intended to be turned over
later to an attorney would be against public policy,' 7 and would allow the
veil of subterfuge often to defeat discovery and disclosure. In view of the
fact that the rule is an exception to the general liability to give testimony,
and that determinations of intent are at best extremely speculative, the
latter holding calling for a more sparing use of the doctrine appears prefer-
able. For example, if a corporation requires all of its agents' reports to be
submitted "for the use of the legal department if and when litigation
arises", should the attorney-client privilege extend to avoid disclosure,
even though the documents would not be otherwise privileged? Seemingly
it does, for the courts have consistently granted immunity to such docu-
ments in the railroad cases,' even where they were made pursuant to a
standing rule requiring their submission on printed forms to the company's
claim agent.19
An examination of the few cases involving insurance companies reveals
that here the courts have not been so consistent. The earliest of these is
a Georgia decision 2 0 which, without giving reasons, allowed the privilege
to letters concerning a claim to be litigated, which passed directly between
an adjuster for the insurer and the insurer's attorney. Apparently these
documents did originate for the purpose of communicating facts to counsel.
Some years later, a Virginia case 21 denied the privilege to an employee's
accident report which was made as a matter of routine and sent to the
attorneys of the insurance company which indemnified the employer. The
court seemed to recognize the report as an independent and pre-existing
document in its statement, "Neither do we think it was a privileged com-
munication if sent by the defendant (employer) to Cabell & Cabell (the
insurance company attorneys) as its attorneys." 22 The distinction between
these two cases would seem to lie in the purpose in which the documents
had their origin. In sympathy with these results, though for a different
reason, is the view set forth by a lower court in New York recently.23
Although the evidence was clear that the insured's statements were given
to the insurer in connection with a claim that was later litigated, the
privilege was refused although the report was discovered in the hands of
the insurer's legal representative. The court reasoned that the privilege
i6. Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co. v. Quick, 3 Q. B. D. 315 (1878), where
the rule is stated in brief: "Documents prepared in relation to an intended action,
whether at the request of a solicitor or not, and whether ultimately laid before the
solicitor or not, are privileged if prepared with a bona fide intention of being laid be-
fore him for the purpose of taking his advice; and an inspection of such documents
cannot be enforced." The English rule is also the rule in Canada. See Thompson v.
Maryland Casualty Co., ii Ont. L. R. 44, 45 (I9o6).
17. See People v. Rittenhouse, 56 Cal. App. 54I, 546, 206 Pac. 86, 88 (I922).
i8. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 236 U. S. 318 (I915) ; Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. v. Williams, 21 Ga. App. 453, 94 S. E. 584 (1917) ; Ex parte Schoepf,
74 Ohio St. i, 77 N. E. 276 (i9o6) ; Cully v. Northern Pac. Ry., 35 Wash. 241, 77 Pac.
202 (1904).
i9. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Williams, 21 Ga. App. 453, 94 S. E. 584 (1917);
Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. I, 77 N. E. 276 (i9o6).
2o. The Fire Ass'n of Phila. v. Fleming, 78 Ga. 733, 3 S. E. 420 (1887).
21. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. Knight, 1o6 Va. 674, 56 S. E. 725 (Igo7).
22. Id. at 68o, 56 S. E. at 727. The report was made out in triplicate, and while
the decision might have been based on the fact that subsequent third party knowledge
would render the communication non-confidential, the language of the court does not
lead to that conclusion.
23. Cote v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., i6o Misc. 658, 29o N. Y. Supp. 483 (Mun. Ct.
1936).
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cannot exist, even though the attorney later gains possession of the docu-
ment, ". . . if at the time of delivery of the statement the relation of
attorney and client did not exist between the recipient and the plaintiff." 24
Like the Virginia court, this decision regards the statements as independent
and pre-existing documents whose admissibility is to be governed by the
client's privileges; but unlike the Virginia court the decision indicates that
had the statements dearly been shown to have been made to only the legal
representative of the insurance company, the privilege would have applied.
However, since the report was that of an individual insured, and not the
prepared statement of a corporation agent, perhaps the latter conclusion is
properly distinguishable from the earlier holding of the Virginia court.
A radical departure from these decisions appears in two recent cases.
An Ohio court in In Re Klemain 25 extended the privilege to cover a docu-
ment in the hands of both insured and insurer's attorney. Here, the
insured, in compliance with his contract of insurance, sent a casualty report
made out by one of its employees to the insurer, who then communicated it
to an attorney (who represented both insured and insurer). The court
stated that the document was ". . . brought into being as a communica-
tion, not in the ordinary course of . . . (the insured's) business," 28 and
therefore privileged, evidently on the ground that it had as its origin the
purpose of communicating facts to counsel. In granting immunity as to
the insurer the court reasoned that "The report thus required, when furn-
ished, becomes the property of the insurance company, and when the orig-
inal or copy thereof is transmitted by the insurance company, either directly
or through an agent, to its attorney, . . . it constitutes a communication
from client to attorney, and as such it is protected as a privileged com-
munication .. "..1, 27 It is interesting to note that the court in so holding
cites one of the earlier railroad cases as an analogy allowing the privilege to
the insurance company.28 However, not only was the report clearly not
intended by the insured as a communication to an attorney, as is at least
the professed intent in the railroad cases, but its confidential nature is
extremely doubtful in view of the fact that it was first submitted to a third
party. And unless the insured is considered as an agent of the insurer, it
is hard to see why the document was not pre-existing and independent as
to the latter. Certainly the insurer had no part in its preparation or expres-
sion. Although the opinion takes general cognizance of these distinctions,
they are not applied to the facts. Under very similar circumstances, the
same result was reached by the California courts in New York Casualty Co.
v. Superior Court,29 where the Klemann case is cited with approval.
Two recent federal cases 3o reach the opposite conclusion with regard
to casualty reports to insurance companies. These are in accord with the
24. Id. at 66o, 29o N. Y. Supp. at 485.
25. In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N. E. (2d) 492 (1936), ioS A. L. R. 51o
(1937).
26. Id. at 192, 5 N. E. (2d) at 494.
27. Id. at 193, 5 N. E. (2d) at 495; and although the court applies the privilege
under § 11494 of the General Code of Ohio, that Code merely reiterates the common
law rule: "The following persons shall not testify in certain respect: i. An attorney,
concerning a communication made to him by his client in that relation or his advice to
his client." Id. at 191, 5 N. E. (2d) at 494.
28. Id. at 193, 5 N. E. (2d) at 495, citing Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. I, 77 N.
E. 276 (I9o6).
29. New York Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 85 P. (2d) 965 (Cal. App. 1938).
30. Kulich v. Murray et al., 28 F. Supp. 675 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Bough v. Lee, 29
F. Supp. 498 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). It must be noted here, that while these cases both
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earlier decisions and the New York holding. Both opinions, although not
closely reasoned on the point, strongly support the contention that such
reports, when made in a routine fashion and later submitted to legal rep-
resentatives, will not be considered within the scope of the attorney-client
privilege. In light of the prevalent holdings that the mere relation of
insurer and insured raises no privilege as to statements passing between
them,31 the latter federal cases and the earlier holdings seem to be more
logical considerations, since in almost every such instance, required reports
are not primarily communications to an attorney, but requisites to the busi-
ness of the corporation. Hence, they logically fall into the second category
where the admissibility of independent documents is governed solely by the
client's privileges, unaffected by any attorney-client relationship.
CONCLUSION
The obvious confusion which the cases exhibit in their attempts to
apply the privilege in situations other than where the document relates to
no one but an individual client bears out, only too well, the observation that
the proper limits are "apparently too intricate to permit of a definite rule
which will solve all concrete cases." If the courts are to abandon the tests
of the established categories, will complete discretion be vested in the trial
judge, as one writer has suggested, to apply the privilege or not as the
subject of inquiry appears "legitimate" to him? " If so, it would be well to
keep in mind that the inherent nature of such immunity is to suppress evi-
dence and hide the truth.83  On the other hand, most of the uncertainty
could seemingly be eliminated by a more careful classification by the courts
as to documents truly originating for the purpose of communicating with
counsel, and those which have primarily an independent existence. This,
combined with a strict adherence to the requisites of confidence and an
existing attorney-client relationship, would seem to limit the scope of the
privilege to those situations where public policy requires the fostering of
the relationship to the exclusion of the general liability to give testimony.
The expression of a contemporary Delaware court that "It may be some-
what doubtful if that privilege, which had its origin in the relation of
attorney and client, applies to transactions between two branches of an
elaborate corporate structure" 34 illustrates the feeling that the salutary
objects sought to be obtained by the rule are perhaps not to be found in
applying it to the relationship between a corporation and its legal advisers.
R.J.F.
arose in New York (and in the latter case the court at pp. 501, 502, cites the case of
Jones v. Reilly, 174 N. Y. 97, 66 N. E. 649 (19o3) as governing authority) and might
be governed by the New York practice as to admissibility, the courts in both cases evi-
dently felt that the evidence would not be admissible even under the broad provisions
of Rule 43 (a) of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There, of three alterna-
tives, federal statute, rules of evidence in equity cases in United States courts, and state
practice where the trial is held, the statute or rule which is most favorable to admitting
the evidence governs. DYER-SMITH, FFDERAL EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL (1939)
§§ 26, 28.
31. Curtis v. Indemnity Company, 327 Mo. 350, 37 S. W. (2d) 616 (1931) ; Cote
v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., i6o Misc. 658, 29o N. Y. Supp. 483 (Mun. Ct. 1936).
32. Note (1937) 46 YALF L. J. 703.
33. This has been the basis for most criticisms of the rule by lawyers and writers
since the time of Jeremy Bentham. See, for example, Seabury's Address (932) A. B.
A. J. 371 (where the application of the privilege to public officials and political organ-
izations is criticized) ; Whipple, The Duty of Disclosure (1922) 56 Am. L. REv. 801;
Bentham's vehement attack is quoted at length at 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291.
34. Wise v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 36 Del. 456, 467, 178 At. 640, 644
(1936).
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Where the Merger of a Chose in Action Into a Judgment Will
Not Be Recognized*
The doctrine that a chose in action is merged into a judgment ren-
dered upon it 1 is generally explained by the theory that where one claim
is represented by two securities of different degrees, the lower merges into
the higher,' for the higher, when it is docketed, becomes a matter of record,
too solemn to be made the subject of judicial inquiry.' The most significant,
and probably the only, real difference is that in a suit upon the judgment
every question which might have been raised in the original suit, regardless
of whether it was in fact put in issue, is conclusively determined,4 and
therefore the judgment forms a complete bar to a subsequent suit between
the parties on the same cause.' The foundation for this result is the prin-
ciple, old as Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence," that no one shall be twice vexed
for the same cause.
7
Perhaps the confusion in the cases where the problem of merger has
arisen is due somewhat to the rigidity of the earlier courts in clinging to
technicalities. They dogmatically asserted that the judgment is of a higher
nature than the cause of action without looking behind the judgment to
determine upon what it was founded,' as they would, for instance, in ascer-
taining the occasion and purpose of the enactment of a statute. However,
strict adherence in all cases does not render the more desirable result, so
that the wisdom of the rule has been questioned and its application nar-
rowed. For example, where no statute is involved, should a mortgagee by
recovering a judgment on a note secured by a mortgage be barred from
later foreclosing on the mortgage? Should the doctrine of merger be
applied to destroy the protection of a guaranty fund given to a depositor,
after he has reduced his claim for deposit to judgment? Should a pre-
ferred creditor in bankruptcy proceedings be deprived of his full claim
merely because he has reduced it to a judgment which technically is now
a new "debt"? To hold that the chose in action "is drowned in the judg-
ment" 9 would deprive the creditor of various superior rights. The courts,
seeing these loopholes in the general doctrine, have laid down the broad
exception that the general rule of "merger will not be carried further than
the ends of justice require". 10
* The scope of this Note does not extend to the subject of collateral attack on a
judgment obtained by fraud, or in a court without jurisdiction, etc. "Judgment" as
used here may be assumed to mean a valid judgment.
i. McGilvray v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 533 (1926) ; Williamsburgh Sav. Bank
v. Town of Solon, 136 N. Y. 465, 32 N. E. lO58 (1893) ; Thomas et aL v. First State
Bank of Panhandle, 57 S. W. (2d) 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
2. United States v. Price, 5o U. S. 83 (1850) ; Runnamaker v. Cordray, 54 Ill. 303
(1870) ; accord, Moore v. Justices of Municipal Court of Boston, 291 Mass. 504, 197
N. E. 487 (1935).
3. Ault v. Zehering, 38 Ind. 429 (1871).
4. Woods v. Locke, 40 Idaho 486, 289 Pac. 61o (1930).
5. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Bachtenkircher, 209 Ind. io6, 198 N. E. 81
(1935), lO4 A. L. R. 1141. Obviously a judgment in rem would not so merge the cause
of action that it could not be prosecuted in pcrsonam. Wallace v. Armstrong, 236 Ill.
App. 457 (1925).
6. Sparry's Case, 5 Co. 61 (I59o).
7. Gray v. Richmond Bicycle Co., 167 N. Y. 348, 6o N. E. 663 (igoi).
8. Brown v. West, 73 Me. 23 (188).
9. Biddleson v. Whitel, i W. Black 5o6, 96 Eng. Rep. R. 293 (1750).
io. Byram v. Miner, 47 F. (2d) 112, 119 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931), cert. denied, 283
U. S. 854 (1931).
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However, the application of this exception has been difficult. What is
injustice today may seem perfectly just tomorrow. With this in mind, an
endeavor has been made to analyze the cases, and to catalog them according
to the various factual situations as they have arisen. It is the primary pur-
pose of this Note to indicate what the courts have done in the past with
reference to each particular situation, in the hope that it will aid in deter-
mining "what the ends of justice require".
WHERE MERGER WOULD DIVEST THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR OF A SECURITY
The case most frequently litigated is where a mortgagor executes a
note, secures it with a mortgage, the mortgagee sues on the note and
recovers a judgment; later the mortgagee attempts to foreclose and the
mortgagor defends on the ground that the note was merged into the judg-
ment, and since the obligation on the note no longer exists, the security
for that obligation no longer exists. However, the courts almost unani-
mously reject this contention, and the authorities lay down as a general rule
that the recovery of a judgment cannot be set up as a defense to an action
of foreclosure,"- in absence of a statute requiring the mortgagee first to
proceed against the security.' 2 In several jurisdiction, however, it has been
held that where a judgment on the note has been obtained, the remedy on
such judgment must first be exhausted by execution.'3 How the judgment
technically becomes secured by the mortgage is not explained by courts
adhering to the majority view. The rationale is that the merger of the
note into a judgment does not extinguish the debt,14 thereby assuming the
exception to the doctrine rather than explaining it.
Where the mortgagee forecloses first, but does not obtain a deficiency
judgment, and subsequently sues on the note, the courts again come to the
conclusion that merger does not apply." Should the debtor reside in a
different jurisdiction than the one in which the security is located, the
question of merger would not arise, for then the note and mortgage would
not be so closely tied together that the creditor must sue on both in the
same action.'8 "He may bring an action against the debtor wherever he
may be found, but can only foreclose the mortgage in the jurisdiction where
the mortgaged land lies." 17
Where the security is in the form of any other type of lien a few juris-
dictions have adhered to the doctrine of merger, concluding that in this
situation its application is not so manifestly unjust. 8 So where the lien-
holder sued on the account giving rise to the obligation, he was precluded
in a subsequent action from foreclosing the lien.' 9 Obviously with the
judgment being on the original debt, i. e., the account, the court was
ir. Boucek v. Pondelicek, 259 Iil. App. 59 (1931) ; Rossiter v. Merriman, 8o Kan.
739, 1O4 Pac. 858 (I9O9), 24 L. R. A. (N. s.) lO95 (1go) ; Rhomberge v. Bender, 28
S. D. 6o9, 134 N. W. 8o5 (1912), 12 COL. L. REv. 468.
12. See I WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FOREcLOSURES (5th ed. i939) § 6.
13. Rossiter v. Merriman, 8o Kan. 739, 104 Pac. 858 (1gog) ; Stegeman v. Fraser,
161 Mich. 35, 125 N. W. 769 (1g9o); Shufelt v. Shufelt, 9 Paige 137 (N. Y. Chan.
1841).
14. 1 WiLTsiE, op. cit. supra note lo, § 162.
15. Id. §8.
16. Houdek v. Brick, 124 Kan. 77, 257 Pac. 753 (1927).
17. Rossiter v. Merriman, 8o Kan. 739, 743, io4 Pac. 858, 859 (1go9).
I8. Wycoff v. Epworth Hotel Construction and Real Estate Co., 146 Mo. App. 554,
525 S. W. 550 (191o) ; Brigel v. Creed, 65 Ohio St. 4o, 6o N. E. 995 (19OI).
19. Wycoff v. Epworth Hotel Construction and Real Estate Co., 146 Mo. App. 554,
125 S. W. 550 (190).
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influenced by its fear that the first adjudication would not be considered
final. These few courts have intimated that once judgment is obtained on
the obligation, the remedy should be founded on that judgment, since once
docketed, by statute in most states, it becomes a lien on all real property
owned by the debtor. This view disregards the possibilities that, subse-
quently to the former lien and prior to the judgment lien, other lienholders
may have come into existence, and to hold the first lien extinguished is to
penalize the creditor for his caution. Fortunately, the great majority of
courts have held that the judgment is not a bar to the enforcement of the
lien; 20 that the question is not one of election with that election being final,
but is rather one of cumulative remedies.
Where the lienholder first resorts to his security and later attempts to
recover on the original obligation, the law is well settled in allowing the
second action. Several jurisdictions, on the other hand, hold the obliga-
tion merged, even though a deficiency has resulted.21 In each instance it
was urged that there had been a technical merger and although the result
was a hardship to the lienholder, to vex the debtor with several suits is
equally a hardship on the latter. However, most courts have refused to
apply merger, saying that the remedies to foreclose on the lien and to
recover on the obligation are again cumulative.2 2  "Otherwise he might be
compelled to await the outcome of a sale of the property affected by the
lien, contemplating a certain deficiency and, at the same time, the disap-
pearance of the other assets of the debtor." 23 In order to avoid two suits
at the same time, New York has passed a statute providing that a lien
cannot be foreclosed when a judgment at law has been rendered on the
debt, unless an execution has been issued and returned unsatisfied.2 4 This
apparently solves the problem.
Upon careful examination of the above situations, there would seem
to be no social policy requiring merger. On one side is the plaintiff, inter-
ested solely in the satisfaction to which he is entitled; on the other, the
defendant, with a right not to be harassed by superfluous suits. But cer-
tainly the latter cannot complain of them as excessive when full satisfac-
tion is all that is being sought. Since the basis for merger is that the
defendant "shall not be twice vexed with the same action", the doctrine
should apply only where it promotes the desired end, and not where it
deprives the cautious creditor of his security. Such was not the intention
of the parties, for they must have anticipated, in actual fact, that the security
stipulated for should exist until actual satisfaction of the debt.2 5  More-
over, a mortgage or a lien has been considered as a cause of action com-
bined with security which in itself is a cause of action 16 and if the former
element is transformed into a judgment, the latter may still remain intact.
2o. Redd Bros. v. Todd, 2o9 Ala. 56, 95 So. 276 (1923) ; Bush v. Block, i93 Mo.
App. 704, 187 S. W. 153 (I916) ; Pierce v. Kinney, 152 App. Div. 638, 137 N. Y. Supp.
475 (3d Dep't 1912).
2!. Daniels v. Ranyons, 164 Ky. 3o9, 175 S. W. 338 (1915); Brigel v. Creed, 65
Ohio St. 4o, 6o N. E. 991 (igoi).
22. Cavalluzzo v. Diamond, IIg Misc. 645, i97 N. Y. Supp. 855 (Ist Dep't 1922);
Beezley v. City of Astoria, 126 Ore. 177, 269 Pac. 216 (1928) ; Turner v. Stewart, 5i
NV. Va. 493, 41 S. E. 924 (19o2).
23. Cavalluzzo v. Diamond, iig Misc. 645, 646, 197 N. Y. Supp. 855 (ist Dep't
1922).
24. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 540.
25. See Riley's Adm'r v. McCord's Adm'r, 21 Mo. 285, 287 (1855).
26. Evansville Gas-light Co. v. State, 73 Ind. 219 (1881).
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WHERE MERGER WOULD PREJUDICE THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR
Not unlike the situations where merger would deprive the judgment
creditor of a security are others where, before judgment, the creditor had
special privileges. To hold that merger creates a new debt would deprive
the creditor of those privileges. Here several situations are involved:
With the passage of laws exempting certain property from execution of
a judgment, the precise question has been frequently litigated. Thus where
a debt is contracted prior to the enactment of a statute exempting such
property (as homesteads), subsequent to such enactment a judgment is
recovered on the debt, and the creditor attempts to assert the judgment as
a lien on the exempt property, the vast majority of the courts follow the
rule that since the debt was contracted prior to the enactment of the stat-
ue, or prior to the acquisition of the property, the property is subject to the
execution of the judgment.27  California, on the other hand, is the only
jurisdiction refusing to look back through the judgment, 28 basing its rea-
soning on the ground that a party taking a homestead should not be
required to go back of the record of the judgment and inquire into the date
of the contract upon which the judgment was rendered. This reasoning
fails to convince, since the records of the court in which the judgment was
obtained would have disclosed the fact. The courts agreeing with the
majority rule reason that the judgment does not in itself create the debt,
but instead it merely recognizes the rights and obligation which were cre-
ated by the original debt. This broad exception to the doctrine of merger
is probably the best illustration of a uniform holding on precisely what
"justice requires".
Where the judgment creditor was entitled, under the original contract
or chose in action, to certain other privileges, the courts again have made
an exception to the general rule of merger. Thus where a depositor, prior
to his bank's going into the control of a guaranty fund commission, recov-
ered a judgment on the deposit, it was held that he was still a "depositor"
rather than an ordinary creditor and was not deprived of the protection of
the guaranty fund given to depositors.29 Here the Nebraska court laid
down the principle that if the creditor was entitled to certain privileges
under the original chose he may be entitled thereto after entry of a judg-
ment based thereon. Just how this broad rule will work out cannot be
foretold. In applying it, to give the creditor the same privileges that he pos-
sessed before judgment should likewise require giving the debtor any cor-
responding privileges, with the result that the original chose is again being
litigated.
Where a judgment is obtained on a sealed instrument, the original
demand becomes merged, but the court will look back through the judg-
ment and hold that the Statute of Limitations for sealed instruments applies
rather than the shorter limitation. 30 Where the creditor had obtained a
judgment before the obligor died, but after the death had entered in probate
a claim based on that judgment, it was held that the creditor could still
bring a proceeding of scire facias to revive the lien of the original judg-
ment, for the court will go behind the allowance of a claim in probate
27. Nowland v. Lanagan, 45 Ark. io8 (1885); Kimball v. Wilson, 59 Iowa 638, 13
N. W. 748 (1882) ; Gregory Co. v. Cale, I15 Minn. 508, 133 N. W. 75 (19I1) ; Smith's
Appeal, 23 Pa. 310 (854).
28. Fitzell v. Leaky, 72 Cal. 477, 14 Pac. 198 (1887) ; Simonson v. Burr, 121 Cal.
582, 54 Pac. 87 (898).
29. State v. Citizens' State Bank of Ralston, 115 Neb. 593, 2r4 N. W. 6 (1927).
30. Batten v. Lowther, 74 W. Va. 167, 8r S. E. 821 (1914).
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(which is a judgment) 31 and consider the nature of the debt. -3 2 The same
principle has been applied to judgments obtained against municipal corpo-
rations upon obligations involving a limitation on the fund which might
be resorted to or the amount of tax which might be levied for their
payment.33
In all the above situations to hold that the judgment is a new debt
wiping out the old, would undoubtedly work a hardship on the creditor.
If satisfaction is his main purpose, rather than an attempt to retry the
issues or vex the debtor, strict application of merger would seem
unfounded.
WHERE MERGER WOULD PREJUDICE OTHER CREDITORS
In no class of cases has the technical operation of the doctrine of
merger been so frequently limited as in the discharge of a debtor in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Where a partnership firm was declared bankrupt and,
before the adjudication, partnership creditors had reduced their claims to
judgments against the individuals one Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the judgments did not change the character of the partnership debts.
34
Since, under the equity rule, partnership creditors have first preference
over partnership assets and individual creditors first preference over indi-
vidual assets,35 to allow the former, merely by obtaining individual judg-
ments, to obtain a preference over other partnership creditors as well as
individual creditors, would completely void the rule.
It would seem that whenever any cause of action is to be affected by
the discharge, its nature should be reviewed by the court where reduced to
judgment. Thus a judgment on a claim which existed prior to the final
discharge but subsequently "merged" is cancelled and annulled, for the
original chose would have been cancelled; the bankrupt may perpetually
enjoin execution on the judgment if application is made within a reasonable
time to the court in which the discharge was obtained.36
Further, where the plaintiffs recovered a judgment based on a statu-
tory liability for action by a mob, but the funds for such obligations were
limited to the amount of taxes which might be levied, the Supreme Court
of the United States held that the chose, even though reduced to judgment,
was still by nature a claim for tort,37 and had to be paid from the special
levy rather than general funds. It was argued that since the claim was
reduced to judgment it was now contractual in nature, and the state statute
involving the limitation on the fund was in violation of the constitutional
provision "that no state should impair the obligations of contracts". How-
ever, this was rejected on the ground that the character of the chose was
not changed but that the judgment merely ascertained and established the
pecuniary amount of loss. On the other hand, where a judgment was
based on a penal statute, it does not abate by the death of the offender
although the original claim would not survive the debtor.
3 8
31. Brown v. Darrah, 95 Ind. 86 (2884) ; McFaul v. Haley, 166 Mo. 56, 65 S. W.
995 (Igo,).
32. Wolford v. Scarbrough, 224 Mo. App. 137, 21 S. W. (2d) 777 (1929), (1930)
43 HaRv. L. REv. 964.
33. City of Harper v. Daniels, 211 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914) ; Smith v. Brode-
rick, 107 Cal. 644, 40 Pac. 1033 (1895).
34. Cutler Hardware Co. v. Hacker, 238 Fed. 746 (C. C. A. 8th, I916).
35. Epstein & Bros. v. First National Bank, 92 Fla. 796, I10 So. 354 (1926).
36. Boynton v. Ball, 121 U. S. 457 (1887) ; Cavanaugh v. Fenley, 94 Minn. 505,
1o3 N. W. 777 (igos).
37. Louisiana v. Mayor, 109 U. S. 285 (7883).
38. Ahearn v. Goble, 90 Colo. 173, 7 P. (2d) 409 (1932).
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Again it seems that the prime motive of the courts should be to give
satisfaction to the judgment creditor, taking into consideration the interests
of all parties involved. Satisfaction should be the controlling factor, much
as it is where a judgment in an action of conversion does not destroy the
original claim, and the plaintiff may maintain replevin or any other pos-
sessory action until full satisfaction is had.
3 9
WHERE MERGER WOULD VOID A STATUTORY PREFERENCE
As pointed out previously, the operation of merger has been limited
to a great extent in bankruptcy proceedings. Where claims of a particu-
lar character are excepted from discharge and they have been reduced to
judgment prior to discharge, the question arises whether, by merger, they
have become new obligations so as to be cancelled as ordinary debts. In
this instance the courts have applied the broad exception, holding that the
judgment retains the character of the indebtedness from which it arose.
40
A decree for alimony is not so merged in a judgment based on it as to
make the decree a provable claim in bankruptcy.4 Had the claim not been
reduced to judgment it would have been excepted from discharge and there
seems no policy which demands that it be made provable only because it
was reduced to judgment. The same is also true where the judgment was
based on a liability for fraud, false pretenses or false representations,
42
on a liability for a wilful or malicious injury,43 or for wages earned ninety
days before seizure of the property by the master.44  But whenever the
party relying upon a judgment, in order to enforce it, is obliged to go back
of the judgment to the debt on which it is founded and on its face it
appears utterly void, the court cannot refuse to take cognizance of that
fact.
4 5
The question of merger further arises where a possible setoff has been
reduced to judgment. Adherence to the strict interpretation of merger
would lead to the conclusion that the claim is a new cause of action and
consequently could not be set off. However the courts again make an
exception and hold that the character of the debt has not been changed. So,
where the maker of a promissory note attempted to set off a judgment pro-
cured by him against the transferor after the transfer, but on a claim exist-
ing at the time of the transfer, the claim giving rise to a judgment was an
equity and the transferee who obtained the note after maturity took it
subject to that equity.46  In fact, the general principle is that where the
39. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (sth ed. 1925) § 581.
40. Carit v. Williams, 74 Cal. 183, 15 Pac. 751 (1887) ; Homer v. Spelman, 78 Ill.
2o6 (1875); Donald v. Kell, in Ind. I, ii N. E. 782 (1887). Contra, Bradford v.
Rice, 2o2 Mass. 472 (1869).
41. Gilchrist v. Cotton, 83 Ind. App. 415, 148 N. E. 435 (1925); Matter of Wil-
liams, 2o8 N. Y. 32, ioI N. E. 853 (r913).
42. In re Shepardson, 22o Fed. 186 (D. Vt. 1915) ; Forsythe v. Vehmeyer, 176 Ill.
359, 52 N. E. 55 (1898), affirmed, 177 U. S. 177 (igoo); Chambers v. Kirk, 41 Okla.
696, 139 Pac. 986 (914).
43. Thompson v. Judy, 169 Fed. 553 (C. C. A. 6th, I9O9); In re Whitney and
Kitchen, 246 App. Div. 45, 13o N. Y. Supp. 629 (Ist Dep't x911).
44. In re Burton Bros. Manufacturing Co., 134 Fed. 157 (N. D. Iowa, 1905).
45. Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U. S. 493 (1889). This case was followed in Board
of Commissioners v. Tome, 153 Fed. 8I (C. C. A. 4th, 1907), involving a judgment
against a township on public aid bonds. Because of the form of the judgment and the
fact that it had become dormant, application to the court was necessary for its enforce-
ment, and this authorized the court to take notice of the invalidity of the act on which
the judgment was based.
46. Gould v. Svendsgaard, 141 Minn. 437, 17o N. W. 595 (1919), 19 COL. L. Ray.
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defendant wishes to set off against an assignee a judgment secured against
the assignor after, but on a claim antedating the assignment, the set-off is
permitted.
4 7
Since the doctrine of merger is primarily for the purpose of preventing
undue litigation, to apply it in the above situations would not effectuate its
purpose. Its application should be lenient, and where the claim was
coupled with certain privileges as well as conditions, the judgment on that
claim should likewise be coupled with those like privileges and conditions.
MERGER OF A JUDGMENT INTO A JUDGMENT
Closely analogous to the broad exception to the doctrine of merger is
the question whether a judgment merges into a subsequent judgment in an
action to revive the first. In this country, under the "full faith and credit"
clause of the Federal Constitution,4 each state refuses to entertain an
action which has been adjudicated in a sister state,49 except that one state
will look behind the judgment of another state if it is based on a penalty
or police regulation of another state.50 The same course is taken where a
judgment on a claim valid in one state is contrary to public policy in another
state.51 With respect to foreign judgments they are said not to constitute
a merger of the cause of action on which it was based so that a suit cannot
be maintained to revive a foreign judgment.5 2
A few courts in the United States hold that a judgment itself is
merged when a suit upon it in an action of debt is prosecuted to judgment,
reasoning that this carries the doctrine of merger to its logical conclusion;
but the cases and writers are most discordant upon this point.53  In favor
of this extension of the doctrine it is argued that the fundamental reason
for merger, that there should be an end of litigation, is most applicable
here; because it is unjust that a creditor should have several outstanding
judgments for a single debt, and should still be able to pile up costs by
continuing suits upon the original judgment ad finitum.54 To this conten-
tion, it is answered by other courts that the debtor has a simple and effec-
tive remedy-he may pay the debt, 5 and for this reasoning, the cogency of
which seems quite beyond the need of support, is sought to be fortified by
the theory that there is no merger because the judgments are securities of
equal degree.56 The question may most justly be decided by simply bal-
ancing two considerations: hardship to the debtor and the necessity of
final satisfaction for the creditor.
47. Gordon v. Decker, ig Wash. 188, 52 Pac. 856 (1899) ; cf. Littlefield v. Albany
County Bank, 97 N. Y. 581 (1885).
48. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § I.
49. 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 1394.
5o. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (0934) § 443.
51. Id. § 445.
52. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) § 213.
53. Price v. First National Bank, 62 Kan. 735, 64 Pac. 637 (19oi) ; 2 FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 58o. But cf. Lilly-Brackett Co. v. Sonnemann, 163 Cal.
632, 126 Pac. 483 (1912) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 2938) § 213.
54. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 580.
55. See Ames v. Hoy, 12 Cal. i1, ig (I859).
56. If a difference in degree means only that in regard to one security questions
may still be raised which in regard to the other are concluded, it is submitted that the
judgments are not of equal degree. Conclusive as a judgment may be, still when sued
upon in a sister state, questions as to the jurisdiction of the court which rendered it,
and as to fraud in its procurement may still be raised. Though there is no authority
for the proposition, it seems that the second judgment would set these questions at rest
forever.
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From this standpoint, that there is no merger seems much the sounder
view. There is less reason for applying the doctrine in this class of cases
than in that where the original cause is held to be merged into the judgment
as discussed above; for there the merger saves the expense and trouble of
reopening all the manifold questions which are necessary to an original liti-
gation. The fact that the plaintiff may abuse his remedy by vexatiously
prosecuting several suits upon one judgment seems no argument for deny-
ing him a remedy when properly used, and in case of abuse it may easily
be denied. On the other hand, a creditor seems entitled to as many judg-
ments as he may in good faith procure before satisfaction, for nothing but
the flight of the debtor from one jurisdiction to another could make many
such suits necessary. Besides, even if the creditor had an outstanding
judgment in every state of the union, a satisfaction of one discharges all,57
and the debtor is not injured except as to costs. Even a more weighty
argument in favor of this view is the effect which the doctrine of merger
has in altering the position of creditors, for courts which adhere to it are
compelled to hold that, with the merger of the first judgment into the sec-
ond, the lien of the first upon the debtor's property is discharged, and that
the creditor, as a reward for his diligence, has his rights postponed to sub-
sequent judgment liens. If these courts look back through the judgment to
the date of the first judgment, they are in effect admitting the weakness of
their argument that there is a merger.
CONCLUSION
In light of the loose language of the courts, dogmatic predictions as to
what the courts would hold in situations not yet litigated cannot be made
and would serve no worthwhile end. But purely on the basis of the ques-
tions litigated, the following general conclusions would seem to be
indicated:
(I) Where an obligation is secured, suit on either the obligation or
security does not so merge the chose into the judgment as to deprive the
creditor of his cumulative remedies. The controlling consideration does
not involve election of remedies, but rather full satisfaction.
(2) Where to hold the chose merged would deprive the judgment
creditor himself of privileges other than security for the claim, the courts
will go behind the judgment and consider the nature of the debt.
(3) Where the creditor's claim is of a particular class, he cannot
improve his position by prosecuting it to judgment to the detriment of
other creditors. The nature of the debt, in effect, has not been changed.
(4) Where merger would deprive the creditor of a preferred claim in
bankruptcy proceedings, or of a right to setoff, the courts hold that the
judgment retains the character and preference of the indebtedness from
which it arose.
(5) Where a suit is brought on a judgment the courts are divided
as to whether the former merges into the latter. However the majority
and seemingly preferable view is that the judgment is not so merged into
the subsequent judgment.
Perhaps more clarity could be given to the question were it not for the
loose language of the courts. Where an attempt is being made to retry the
issues, the courts have laid down the dogma that the chose is merged into
the judgment and no inquiry as to its nature can now be made. Later, when
57. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 442.
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the same court is confronted with a situation where to adhere to the doc-
trine would undoubtedly cause hardship as in situations illustrated above,
it has found it difficult to avoid the strong language previously set forth.
No one can deny that the merger of a chose in action into a judgment
is a fundamental rule of our law. But when "exceptions" to a rule are
numerous, it would seem preferable to refer to them as rules of law in them-
selves, rather than as true exceptions. There is nothing fatal in applying
the doctrine of merger for some purposes and not for others. The situa-
tions enumerated are of a type where its application would defeat other
legal principles, more fundamental than the merger doctrine.
As to questions not yet litigated no dogmatic predictions can be made.
However, unless express consideration of the interests of all the parties is
given by the courts, no conclusions can be drawn. When precise, rather
than loose language, comes to be used then the limitation of the doctrine
will be something more than a matter of speculation.
W. E. L.
